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Abstract:  Increasing understanding of the impressive cognitive and social capacities of nonhuman 
animals suggests the possibility that they may sometimes commit suicide. Such notions tend to be 
dismissed as “anthropomorphism.” That interpretive hazard, I argue, must be weighed against the 
opposite hazard of “anthropodenial” — “the a priori rejection of shared characteristics between 
humans and animals” (de Waal 2006). If animals do commit suicide, how often is it motivated 
precisely by the impact of humans on animal life?   
 
 
Ryan Hediger, Associate Professor of 
English at Kent State University, teaches 
U.S. literature, animal studies, and 
ecocriticism. He has published essays on 
military dogs in the U.S. conflict in 
Vietnam, hunting and violence in 
Hemingway’s work, and Werner Herzog’s 




Peña-Guzmán (2017) makes a compelling case that debates about animal suicide often hinge on 
unexamined assumptions about both nonhuman animal and human capacities. His careful 
scrutiny of these assumptions shows that they can affect thinking about suicide and death. If we 
cannot be sure whether conscious desires cause animal suicide, then we cannot always be sure 
they cause human suicide. As so often happens in animal studies, revisiting nonhuman animal 
capacities unsettles our understanding of human capacities.  
Peña-Guzmán cites studies indicating that animals have “awareness of death,” including 
evidence of animal mourning, such as burial rituals and melancholia, in a range of species (King 
2016). These behaviors do seem to show some sort of awareness of death; but how much 
awareness is required to make suicide, as commonly understood, possible? Again, considering 
the human side makes this question thornier. Although humans are often credited with having 
awareness of death, philosopher Jacques Derrida raises important questions about just how far 
that goes. In his lectures on humans and animals gathered together in the book The Animal That 
Therefore I Am (2008), Derrida criticizes the tendency to define humans in part by our awareness 
of death (pp. 27-28): According to Derrida, death is not knowable to the living; we can know of it 
but cannot know it. This weakens the human-animal distinction from the human side. The 
ethological data about animal awareness of death brings humans and animals still closer.   
Yet Derrida does not mean to deny entirely the differences among forms of life. He 
questions what might be called the “hyperseparation” of humans from other animals,1 
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recognizing differences but insisting that they are less absolute than commonly supposed. Where 
do the differences end and the similarities begin? We face a constant concern in these inquiries: 
anthropomorphism. Peña-Guzmán deliberately raises that specter himself in discussing the 
possibility of dolphin suicide in order to claim that it does not apply. In addition to the evidence 
of dolphins’ impressive abilities, which imply the possibility of their committing suicide, Peña-
Guzmán suggests — like Derrida — that a larger bias infects thinking about animals: “the bias of 
humanism.” His reply hinges in part on the blow to humanism delivered by Charles Darwin, whose 
notion of evolution demonstrates that human beings do not stand entirely apart from the rest of 
creation but evolved with it and within it. Peña-Guzmán accordingly favors a “continuist” view of 
suicide, recognizing that there is no single version of suicide and that different animals can be 
understood to exhibit different versions of suicidal behaviors.  
Continuism makes good empirical and ethical sense, allowing for both likeness and 
difference. The hazard that is the reverse of “anthropomorphism” is what de Waal (2006) has 
called “anthropodenial”:  
 
“the a priori rejection of shared characteristics between humans and animals … willful 
blindness to the human-like characteristics of animals or the animal-like characteristics of 
ourselves…. It reflects a pre-Darwinian antipathy to the profound similarities between 
human and animal behavior (e.g. maternal care, sexual behavior, power seeking) noticed 
by anyone with an open mind.” (p. 65)  
 
These likenesses, de Waal notes, mean that a judicious form of anthropomorphism is not a 
problem; indeed, he suggests, it is often entirely rational and fits with what we know about human 
and nonhuman life. Without using exactly this terminology, Peña-Guzmán shows, regarding 
animal suicide, anthropodenial is at least as big a problem as anthropomorphism.  
This does not necessarily mean that nonhuman animals commit suicide often. The rare 
exceptions may even prove the larger rule. Peña-Guzmán’s example of the dolphin Kathy is 
especially disconcerting. I find his case persuasive that Kathy may well have consciously ended 
her own life, based on both the ethological and subjective evidence. Dolphins’ intelligence is well-
known, and Kathy’s own depression from “living her entire life in captivity” offers enough context 
to make suicide seem plausible. Her case may show that at least some nonhuman animals are 
capable of suicide. But is it common? In this case, it was the highly unnatural, human-created 
circumstances that would have led her to decide to end her life. The ironies of this situation are 
grim: A dolphin’s captivity is based on the assumption that there is a fundamental difference 
between humans and other animals (a difference that also justifies holding so many other animals 
captive in zoos and elsewhere); this in turn leads Kathy to “refute” the putative human/animal 
difference with an act that looks very much like suicide. Suicidal behaviors are often responses to 
unbearable social and personal conditions — conditions that intelligent humans have become all 
too good at creating.  
Peña-Guzmán’s argument that other animals can and sometimes may commit suicide 
raises further questions about why anyone commits suicide, and about whether or to what extent 
we should see suicide — in humans or in other animals — as natural. How often might suicide, 
whether by humans or by other living organisms, result from excessive human intervention in and 
management of life itself? To what extent might suicide be anthropogenic?      
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1 See Plumwood (1993) for a discussion of this term, mostly in reference to human gender differences (pp. 
47-55).  
                                                          
